This fascinating map recently came to my attention. It shows the strong regional differences in the way Americans refer to ‘soda.’ There is a large ‘pop’ zone extending across the mid-West, while the South is ‘Coke’ country – appropriately enough since Coca-Cola is based in Atlanta. California is a soda zone, and there is a curious cluster of soda-speakers around St. Louis Missouri.

In the map pop is blue, coke is red and soda is yellow/green.

Coca cola would have liked everyone to be singing on the same page, but its bid for global hegemony has failed.

Many countries around the world have proudly defended their indigenous colas. Examples include Inca Kola in Peru (actually founded by an Englishman in 1935).

In Russia the Ni Kola (No Cola) company has been marketing kvas, a traditional non-alcoholic beer type drink, as an anti-American beverage.

This ad shows what happens when Dad returns home having started to drink Coke. The expert says “No to cola-nization. Kvas is the health of the nation.”

In this ad the man, speaking in bad Russian, lists the benefits that the US has given to the world, and says that kvas is uncivilized.

India saw the introduction of Thums Up cola in 1977 after Coke gave up trying to market its own products in the face of protectionist barriers. In 1990 Pepsi entered India, and in 1993 Thums Up was bought out by Coca Cola.This ad nicely connects Thums Up to the Durga Puja festival in Kolkata.

Coke uses Thums Up to attack Pepsi. Here is an anti-Thums Up ad from Pepsi.

I think the ad is making fun of the Thums Up commercials which show their hero doing dangerous stunts.

I addressed the question of Beer and Nationalism in an earlier post. For an update on this important theme, see this posting on beer commercials and the preparations for ANZAC Day in Australia and New Zealand.

I just published a commentary discussing Putin’s take on nationalism in the Moscow Times. This topic is also addressed in today’s New York Times.

PUTIN’S NATIONALITY DILEMMA

In Prague, tourists line up to visit the ”New-Old” synagogue, which was new when it was built, in 1270. On Jan. 23, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin published an essay on the “national question” in Nezavisimaya Gazeta. Like the Prague synagogue, Putin’s article is something that is called new, but in fact, it is quite old.

The good news was that there is no sign of Putin playing the nationalism card. Such fears were triggered by his reaction to the December 2010 clashes in Moscow between Russian and North Caucasian youth when he met with soccer fans. While calling for tighter controls on migrant workers in his article, Putin recognizes that they are here to stay, and he defends the country’s federal and multiethnic structure.

As political analyst Andrei Makarkin has noted, one important development this past year has been that many ultra- nationalist leaders have given up on trying to work with the Kremlin. Many of them have now formed an alliance with democrats and Communists in opposition to the rigged Dec. 4 elections. Several leading nationalists were given the right to speak from the tribune at the protest demonstrations. Opposition leader Alexei Navalny has often deployed nationalist rhetoric and promotes the ”Stop Feeding the Caucasus!” slogan, something that Putin’s article specifically targets as dangerous for the Russian state.

Although Putin is rejecting an alliance with ultranationalists, the bad news is that his approach is a thinly disguised recycling of Soviet nationality policy. Writer Alexander Morozov has suggested that the core ideas in Putin’s article were taken from a 2010 Education Ministry proposal for promoting “polycultural” education. But they are rooted in a much deeper-rooted discomfort with recognizing the force of minority national identity. Putin’s model is a Russia-centric view that glosses over the fears and aspirations of the nonethnic Russians who make up 20 percent of the country, a statistic that was nowhere to be found in Putin’s article.

Putin argues that the traditional European nation-state is based on a closed model of national culture. This meant that the Europeans were reluctant to integrate Muslim immigrant populations. Instead they opted for a “multicultural project,” which Putin now deems a failure.

Russia, in contrast, is a ”multiethnic civilization with Russian culture at its core,” a tradition, which Putin says is rooted in the “expansive Russia” of tsarist times. “Russia’s state development is unique,” writes Putin. “It is neither an ethnic state nor an American melting pot.”

Russian identity, rather, is that of a “civic nation” — one that is rooted in loyalty to the state. Putin argues that this is why Russians living in other countries fail to organize themselves as a cohesive diaspora. Putin does not use the term “Rossiisky,” which former President Boris Yeltsin was fond of using to denote civic as opposed to ethnic identity. This kind of statist nationalism is unacceptable to ultranationalists who are driven by hatred of the West as an external enemy and Muslims from the North Caucasus and Central Asia as an internal enemy.

But Putin goes on to say, “This kind of civilizational identity is based on preserving the dominance of Russian culture.” He calls upon Russian intellectuals to preserve the country’s “unified cultural code.” This can only be alarming to Russia’s minorities who have seen their autonomy steadily eroded over the past decade. For example, they have objected to the unified state exam for university entrants, which was introduced two years ago, which can only be taken in Russian.

In fact there is nothing particularly unique about Russia’s approach to national identity. All modern states try to guarantee civic rights while also resting on some common ethnic and linguistic foundation. Putin praises Russian identity for achieving “unity in diversity” — perhaps not realizing that is the official motto of the European Union since 2000 and is almost identical in meaning to ”e pluribus unum” — or “many united into one” — which the United States adopted as its seal in 1782.

The problem is that Russia faces ethnic and religious insurgencies in the North Caucasus that have no equivalent in Europe or the United States. Moscow needs to come up with some new ideas to tackle these problems. But after 12 years in power, it would be unrealistic to expect any new thinking from Putin.

2012 marks the 600^th anniversary of the birth of Joan of Arc, which has triggered an intense bout of political posturing as French politicians maneuver to claim her mantle.

Last week  President Nicholas Sarkozy visited Domremy-la-Pucelle, the village said to have been her birthplace. He said “Joan doesn’t belong to any party, any faction, any clan. May we continue to think of her as the symbol of our unity and not leave her in the hands of those who would use her to divide.” It is clear who he has in mind – National Front leader Marine Le Pen, whose strong public support could damage Sarkozy’s chances in the upcoming presidential election in April. Every May 1^st the National Front holds a parade in honor of Joan who, as Le Pen put it, kicked out 15^th century English ‘immigrants.’

Joan was burnt at the stake by the English in 1431, at the age of 19, for her role in rallying resistance to their invading army at the tail end of the 100 Years War. The religious court could not prove that she was talking to the Devil so they got her on a technicality – cross-dressing as a man. (A bit like jailing Al Capone for tax evasion.) Joan became an important but deeply contested symbol of religious purity and national pride. As left and right struggled to define French national identity in the wake of the Revolution, Joan became for both sides a symbol of French unity and resistance to foreign influence. Canonized in 1920, she always seemed a more suitable symbol for the Catholic Right, and the Joan cult was vigorously promoted by the Vichy government during WW2. In the last 30 years or so, she has been appropriated by the far right.

The Guardian wrote that “Joan of Arc has inspired an industry with more than 20,000 books published in France, around 50 films and, recently, video games.”

Joan is a somewhat unusual figure to have as a national hero. Usually they are leaders – and men. The closest equivalent in Britain or American history would I guess be Robin Hood (like Joan a marginal figure who challenged the existing authorities) or Nathan Hale – executed in 1776 by the English, like Joan, at the age of 21, but not before he said “I only regret that I have but one life to give for my country.” Britain has female heroes in its own pantheon – also resisting foreign invasion, from Queen Boudica who battled the Romans, to Elizabeth I who battled the Spanish, to Margaret Thatcher who battled the Argentinians.

The fact that Joan is a woman reminds us that nationalism is a deeply gendered concept. Even if national heroes are usually male, all national narratives draw on women as symbols of nationhood. Often the figure is that of a mother, since the mother gives birth to future sons of the nation, teaches them their mother tongue, and sends them off to war. (Think Mother Russia, or Mother India.) But the virgin maiden is also a powerful image: a future mother, also an object of protection, affection and lust for contemporary men. Marianne was chosen as a symbol of the new French republic in 1792, and this new tradition continued with Eugene Delacroix’s “Liberty Leading the People”(1830). It was common to portray the American Republic as a maiden, as in John Garst’s “Manifest Destiny” (1845) – not to forget the Statue of Liberty, of course.

In contemporary France, it is not a coincidence that the most intense battle for French identity has revolved around the right of Moslem women to wear the headscarf (hijab) in school or full-face burqa in public places. Moslem men it seems can wear whatever headgear or facial hair that they like. This confirms that the most emotionally resonant representation of the nation is the female form.

I have been busy for the past month, attending a stream of conferences marking the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Soviet Union. One of them was at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, Korea, which prompted me to write this piece, a short version of which was published in the Moscow Times.

Nationalism in the two Koreas

The major unknown in Korean politics is the question of reunification with the North. Kim Jong Il’s death will not substantially alter the prospects for unification – which remains unlikely for the foreseeable future.
Over the past few years tensions in the Korean peninsula have been mounting due to uncertainty over the political transition that was clearly looming in the North, given Kim Jong Il’s failing health and overt steps to groom his son Kim Jong Un as his chosen successor.
Now that Kim Jong Il has died, there are various scenarios that could play out if the leadership transition goes sour. The worst case scenario would be chaos and civil war, possibly leading to Chinese intervention. Dartmouth College academic Jennifer Lind estimates that even a peaceful collapse could require up to 400,000 troops to stabilize North Korea. The best case – a popular uprising leading to unification with the South – seems extremely unlikely.
Repeated efforts by South Korea and the international community to seek a peaceful resolution to the 60 year-old military standoff have been set back by Pyongyang’s erratic behavior, most notably its pursuit of nuclear weapons as the ultimate bargaining chip. Currently the Seoul government has suspended all contacts with the North in the wake of last year’s violence – the March sinking of the naval vessel Cheonan, with the loss of 46 sailors, and the shelling of the Yeonpyong island in November. These acts were seen by some observers as part of an effort to appease military hardliners and bolster Kim Jong Un’s image as someone who could stand up against North Korea’s perceived enemies.
Officials from the Korean National Unification Institute whom I talked to during a visit to Seoul last week confirmed that prospects for unification look grim. The current government of President Myung-bak Lee has lost faith in the prospects for diplomatic overtures to the North, and there will be no fresh initiatives from Seoul until parliamentary and presidential elections next year.
More broadly, a new generation of Koreans has grown up for whom the war is something their grandparents lived through, and who enjoy life in a prosperous democracy. They seem reluctant to shoulder the burdens that unification would entail – from the risk of war to the economic costs of reconstructing the North. It is ironic that South Korea’s incredible success as an industrial powerhouse and technological innovator seems to have made the resolution of the unification issue even less feasible.
Germany’s unification in 1990 in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall had raised hopes that Korea would soon follow suit, but that has not happened. The Pyongyang regime is a home-grown tyranny that shows no sign of throwing in the towel, unlike the East German regime which had no chance of surviving once Moscow signaled that the use of force would not be tolerated. In North Korea of course there is no possibility of an organized resistance from civil society of the sort we saw in East Europe. Nor is it even clear that the people, totally isolated from outside media, are able to see through their indoctrination and develop a desire for change. The regime has abandoned Marxism in favor of an extreme nationalism, the purported goal of which is unification of the peninsula through the military might of the North.
Unification aside, nationalism continues to play a leading role in South Korean politics.  Every day there is a headline carrying a nationalism-related theme. The legacy of World War Two and the Cold War weigh heavier on Korea than any other nation. In this part of the world, the Cold War is not over, and there is a real danger that it might turn into a hot war.
This history is embedded in a tense triangular relationship between China, Japan and the Koreas, where historical enmities currently play out in clashes over territorial claims over the surrounding waters.
On December 14 hundreds rallied in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul to insist on a formal apology and compensation for the estimated 200,000 Korean women forced into sex slavery during World War Two. The rally attracted headline coverage because it was the 1000th weekly rally since the movement began in 1992. Japan argues that the issue was resolved by the 1965 treaty between the two countries, which included an $800 million compensation payment to Korea in return for waiving any future claims for wartime-related damages.
The same day a shot was fired at the Korean embassy in Beijing – a response to Korean complaints about an incident on December 12 in which a Chinese fisherman stabbed to death a Korean naval officer who had boarded the Chinese vessel, which was fishing in Korean territorial waters.
The continuing presence of 28,000 U.S. troops is a trigger for nationalism-inspired protests from the Left. The most recent demonstrations are protesting the new free-trade agreement with the U.S that was ratified by the South Korean parliament last month.
Given the uncertainty in the North, however, the U.S. presence is seen by many Koreans as a deterrent against full-scale military aggression by Pyongyang. North Korea is a nuclear power, while South Korea is not, so the U.S. nuclear arsenal may well be key to preventing an all-out North Korean attack.

Michael Bohm has an interesting article in the Moscow Times summarizing the ambiguous and contested nature of national identity in Russia. The problem is that in the Soviet Union the state cultivated a supra-national identity: New Soviet Man. Some of that tradition carried over under Boris Yeltsin, who promoted an ethnically neutral civic identity. One step in that direction was the abolition in 1997 of the ‘fifth paragraph’ on identity cards which recorded each person’s ethnicity.

Non-ethnic Russians make up 20 percent of the population of the Russian Federation, and some of the minority ethnic groups, such as the Tatars, objected to the removal of the fifth paragraph, arguing that it would lead to the erosion of their language and culture.

Russian nationalists complain that the ethnic ‘neutrality’ of the Russian state works to the disadvantage of the ethnic Russians. They argue that the 21 ethnic republics within the Russian Federation, which enjoy a fair degree of autonomy, unfairly benefit from generous federal subsidies and tax breaks. Some also complain that vote-rigging in the ethnic republics heavily favors United Russia and President Putin. See for example this September 8 speech by the leading Russian nationalist Dmitry Rogozin in which he calls for the ‘renationalization’ of the Russian people (in Russian).

Most of these complaints are targeted at the North Caucasus, where ethnic conflict and terrorism has spilled over from Chechnya into Ingushetiya, North Ossetia and especially Dagestan. Some are even suggesting that Russia should withdraw completely from the North Caucasus. See for example these clips from the campaign “Enough with feeding the Caucasus!” (in Russian). For analytical background see this March 2011 report from the CSIS The North Caucasus; Russia’s Volatile Frontier, discussed at this roundtable.

In addition to the ethnic minorities who are Russian citizens, Russia is home to some 10 million immigrants from the former Soviet Union, mainly from Central Asia and the Caucasus, who are drawn to work in cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg which are short of labor. (Russia has the second-highest number of immigrants in the world, after the US.) These immigrants are regularly the target of racist assaults, as documented by the Sova Center.

This general disaffection about the state of Russian identity is not politically threatening unless and until some groups are able to mobilize it for political purposes. There are two focal points for such mobilization: elections, and protests that flare up as a result of antagonism towards ethnic minorities and migrants. The Kremlin has been able to neutralize xenophobic parties by creating their own nationalist movements, and by tightly controlling the registration and leadership of parties allowed to compete in State Duma elections.

On the Kremlin’s manipulation of nationalism, see this recent oped by Vladimir Ryzhkov. I discussed the radical nationalist fringe groups in an earlier post, and I have a book chapter analyzing the course of nationality policy under Putin.

There’s not much good news coming out of Pakistan these days. But at a conference at Wesleyan University on October 1, a group of Pakistan experts were cautiously optimistic about some of the trends unfolding in that troubled country.

Since its creation, Pakistan’s identity has been defined in contrast to India. Veteran journalist Najam Sethi, editor of Lahore’s Friday Times, explained that in Pakistani politics the foreign policy tail wags the domestic politics dog – and that means the army, as the guardian of national security, can play a pivotal role. Despite the track record of four coups against civilian governments, Sethi argued that a coup is unlikely in the near future. Recent years have seen the activization of a combative media (local TV as well as newspapers) and an independent-minded judiciary. Equally significant is the fact that the opposition Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif has signaled that it has no inclination to support a military coup against the incumbent People’s Party government. Previous coups were only possible because of the compliance of rival parties, and the judiciary.

Facing creeping political marginalization, the army has stepped up its nationalist appeal. But one other recent trend according to Sethi is a shift from anti-Indianism as the cornerstone of Pakistani nationalism towards anti-Americanism – a trend accelerated by the uptick in drone attacks and the raid to kill Osama Bin Laden. This development may be bad news for America – but it may ironically contribute towards peace in the region if it facilitates reconciliation between New Delhi and Islamabad.

At the Wesleyan panel, Harvard economics professor Asim Ijaz Khwaja likewise saw grounds for optimism in the increase in civil society engagement, as evidenced for example by the spread of private (non-religious) schools, now accounting for one third of all pupils. He acknowledged that there was an increase in self-identification as Muslim, but he saw this as complementing and not substituting for Pakistani identity.  Sethi saw these two identity categories as in tension with each other, claiming that polls show 70% of Pakistanis identify primarily as Muslim.

London University professor Humeira Iqtidar had an interesting and somewhat controversial take on the rise of political Islam. She defines Islamism as the movement to develop a political agenda based on Islamic principles – that is, to engage with the modern state, and to start a discussion about what it means to be Muslim. Islamism is not simply a pietist desire to return to a traditional past. But in becoming engaged in politics, Islamist movements are forced to compete and bargain with other groups, and this find themselves inadvertently contributing to the emergence of a de-facto pluralism within democratic rules of the game. You can find her argument in this June 2011 article from the Guardian. She is the author of Secularising Islamists? Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat-ud-Dawa in Pakistan (2011).

Another challenge to Pakistani identity is the growing regionalism. Decentralization was a consequence of the 18^th amendment to the constitution passed in April 2010, weakening the powers of the presidency. More power has been devolved to the provinces  – another reason why a military coup is less likely.  I discussed Baluchi separatism in an earlier blogpost. As discussed in a recent article in the The Dawn, there is also a modest separatist movement in Sindh, building its identity as “land of sufis” more tolerant than Punjab.